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of history and philology). In 1855, as a result of the opening of the Oriental faculty in the University of St. Petersburg, instruction in Oriental languages in the university of Kazan was stopped and the library and other accessories for the most part brought to St. Petersburg.

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Instruction in Muhammadan languages was resumed in the university of Kazan in 1861. According to the census of 1897, Kazan had 131,508 inhabitants, in 1911 182,477, of whom 30,781 were Tatars.

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(W. BARTHOLD)

p. 838-A

KAZAK SOCIAL STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION

IN this paper I have attempted to explain the nature of certain features of Turco-Mongol social structure by an examination of some of the processes which appear to have been active in their development. The study is based on information gathered during field work among the Kazak from July to October 1936.¹ Most of the material, unless otherwise indicated, relates to the middle of the nineteenth century, to the period immediately preceding the Russian conquest of Central Asia.

The Kazak,² frequently referred to in the older ethnographic literature as Kirghiz, were until very recently a nomadic stock breeding people but are now rapidly adopting a sedentary life. They inhabit the steppe country between, roughly, the Caspian Sea and the Altai Mountains and number, according to the census of 1926, 3,959,000. Traditionally they were divided into three "hordes" or ordas: the Great Orda in the east and the Little Orda in the west, with the Middle Orda between them. They speak a Turkic language which is classed by Deny³ with Kirghiz and Bashkir as a "western dialect." The Kazak are definitely Mongoloid in physical appearance with evidence of considerable Caucasoid admixture among the southern and western groups. Basic Kazak culture, which has been summarized by Murdock⁴ is closely related in nearly every aspect with that of the Kirghiz, Turcoman, Kalmyk, and Mongols. Historically the Kazak can be first dated as a distinct people in 1465⁵ although the names of some of their constituent groups may be traced much farther back.⁶ They were gradually conquered by the Russians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and now form a republic of the Soviet Union.

Although the literature on the Kazak is large the details of their social organization have remained obscure. They are usually described as divided into a large number of tribes, sub-tribes, gentes and "branches" whose structure, function and relation to one another are not clear. In this study I have sought to define the nature of Kazak social groupings, the process of their origin and their relation to economic life, marriage and the family, class stratification, and political administration.

¹ Field work was made possible financially by a University Fellowship from the Yale Graduate School and a grant from the Institute of Human Relations of Yale University.

² The present official Russian form of the name, transliterated, is Kazakh. This was adopted in order to avoid confusion with Cosack, which is also Kazak in Russian. In Kazak orthography the name is Qazaq but I have used the more familiar form.

³ Deny, *Les Langues turques*, 203.

⁴ Murdock, *Our Primitive Contemporaries*, 157-62.

⁵ Muhammad Haider, *The Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, 82.

⁶ Stein, *Kirgiz-Kazak*, 8.

gens, and then adds that relationship in the male line was an obstacle to marriage through nine generations.

The Yakut concept of the exogamic gens as defined by generations is apparent in the quotation given above from Seroshevskii's informant.

Present information is inadequate to explain completely the relation between group and generation exogamy, but it seems possible that the latter may have developed in connection with and as a result of the constant tendency of the gentes to give off branches, each of which considered itself related to the others and to the parent group by descent from a common ancestor. Thus as a result of rapid branching and formation of new groups, membership in different divisions might be no indication of the absence of close relationship which could be guaranteed only by the actual genealogies. The application of the method of reckoning possible matings by the number of intervening generations would then only be necessary between groups who were conscious of their recent separation. In other cases group membership would be accepted as indicative of a lack of close relationship.

The ultimate causal factor in the constant development of new groups appears to have been economic. Cattle raising could not be carried on in one place by large numbers of people because of the lack of sufficient grazing land. Sections of the original group therefore tended to depart in search of new pastures. Such an explanation of the branching process need not necessarily involve the assumption that the total number of groups was continually increasing. Some groups became extinct through the dying out of family lines or annihilation in war. In discussing Kazak uru genealogies my informants noted the names of several groups which had ceased to exist. Those which survived, however, and did increase in numbers inevitably tended to split. That there was an actual growth of population which favored the branching process is indicated by census reports, although most statistics for the numbers of the nomads are little better than rough estimates. The Russian census figures for 1897 and 1911 which deal in very round numbers and do not distinguish carefully between different groups, suggest an increase in population during the fourteen year period of between fifteen and thirty percent for the various steppe tribes.¹⁶ The Soviet census figures for 1926 are not readily comparable with these because of the different classifications employed. Levshin's estimate of the numbers of the three Kazak ordas together in 1832 as between two million and two million four hundred thousand¹⁷ was based upon the guess of the Kazak themselves, who might more probably exaggerate than understate. That they did so is suggested by Ujfalvy's figures of 1,300,000 or 1,400,000 in 1878 which, however, are themselves without firm foundation.¹⁸ According to the Soviet census of 1926 there were then 3,959,900 Kazak in Kazakstan and the other republics of Central Asia.¹⁹ A comparison of Levshin's probably high estimate for 1832 with the 1926 figures suggests a possi-

¹⁶ See Czaplicka, *Turks of Central Asia*, 33-47.

¹⁷ *Description des hordes*, 300.

¹⁸ *Expédition scientifique*, 2: 25.

¹⁹ *Handbook of the Soviet Union*, 7; figures for the 1936 census are not available.

HUDSON: KAZAK SOCIAL STRUCTURE

101

ble doubling of the nomad population in slightly less than a hundred years. This is not a (6) phenomenal growth²⁰ but it must be remembered that it was accomplished during a period of increasingly active domination by an alien culture such as is frequently marked by a decline of native populations. If maintained steadily over a period of several centuries it 000 should be sufficient to necessitate the frequent formation of new groups in the pastoral economy.

On this point Bogoras writes:²¹

Extensive cattle breeding, when practiced for a long period of time, like agriculture, creates abundance of food and so makes it possible for the tribe to grow in numbers from one generation to another. In this way the tribes of real nomads increased largely and became populous nations numbered in hundreds of thousands. . . . On the other hand the tribes of the primitive culture, living with reindeer breeding, hunting or fishing never have large numbers. The paleoasiatics of Siberia . . . are numbered often in simple hundreds, or at the utmost in a couple of thousands.

Although increase in numbers was apparently the underlying cause of fission, the immediate causes were no doubt various, differing somewhat in each instance. Usually the process would appear to have been a gradual one in which the new group came to be considered as a separate unit only after several generations. The custom of giving to each son a share of his father's cattle, by which new economic nuclei were constantly being created, favored the centrifugal tendency. Quarrels between individuals, and the dissatisfactions and rivalries of different leaders and factions no doubt frequently produced sudden divisions within particular groups. My informants emphasized that disputes between the large herd owners over the use of pasture land would often end in the breakup of the group. Personal jealousies and dislikes easily led to separation, or even to the expulsion of minorities who must then shift for themselves.²² Pallas²³ noted the frequency with which the clashing claims of rival relatives produced regroupings of the people among the Kalmyk. Also secession to minorities sufficiently organized to make use of it, was a means of escape from the exactions of overbearing rulers. In this connection Radlov remarks:²⁴

Die einzige Abwehr gegen Ungerechtigkeiten und Gewaltthätigkeiten ist eben festes Zusammenhalten der Familien und Nachbarn unter Anführung bestimmter Persönlichkeiten; in diesen Vereinigungen liegt der Keim zu immer neuer Gruppierung der Geschlechter.

The appearance of new groups by fission also took place on a larger scale than that represented by the branching out of blood related gentes. An excellent example of this is

²⁰ See for example, Kroeber, *Peoples of the Philippines*, 26-29. The population of Java is stated to have increased fifteen times in less than a century and a half.

²¹ Bogoras, *Paleoasiatic Tribes*, 260.

²² The exclusion of Jaouredai from the gens sacrifices by his half-brother, as cited above, is a case in point. Jaouredai departed to establish his own group.

²³ Pallas, *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten*, 1: 187.

²⁴ *Aus Sibirien*, 1: 418.

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578 Kaip's principal descendants are indicated in the genealogical chart which we have made for them, as are the descendants of Abulkhair, as a complement to Tevkelev's charts to which we referred at the appropriate time.

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Part III. Statistical Information on the Kirghiz-Kazaks

Chapter I. Population

101 When one speaks of a little known people, the first questions which seem proper to ask are usually as to what country they inhabit and what their population is.

The answer to the first is found here in the description which we give of the area occupied by the Kazaks, whose borders we also indicate [in untranslated section]. The solution of the second seems impossible to us. If many of the civilized countries of Europe cannot know the exact number of their inhabitants, how can it be attained when it is a matter of half-savage nomads, who have no principle of administration, who are constantly moving from one place to another, and with whom the simple words of counting the people can suffice to cause an uprising?

Nurali, khan of the Little Horde, wished to know the exact number of Kazaks under his authority, and he charged his sons who governed the various tribes of this people with this duty. But a number of obstacles halted them from the first steps. He did not achieve his end and only managed to arouse grumbling and grave suspicions.

166 A large part of the Kazaks who settled permanently in 1801 and 1802, under the orders of Sultan [300] Bukei, in the most

favorable locations of the government of Astrakhan, crossed the Ural again in 1820 because the rumor had spread among them that it was wished to make a census of them and settle them in fixed places.

If one adds to this trait of their national character the vast expanse of the steppes occupied by the Kazak hordes and the

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[300 cont.]

- 161 divisions of these hordes into several parts, he will be fully convinced that an exact census of this people is absolutely impossible.

Thus it is necessary to be content with information, no doubt quite uncertain, which they themselves have transmitted to the
162 Russians and which is far from resting on adequate data. The result of this is that the three hordes are composed of approximately 400,000 tents or families, and that of this number, the Great Horde has about 75,000, the Middle Horde 165,000, and the Little Horde 160,000 (1).

- [161] 1. Since the beginning of the 14th /19th?/ century, the Little Horde has suffered considerable losses in men, as much through internal dissensions as through misunderstandings with their neighbors.

The number of individuals living in each tent is not always the same, but there is good ground for believing that the truth will not be distorted in carrying it to five or six, on the average. Consequently, the Great Horde would have 375,000 to 450,000 persons, the Middle Horde about 1,000,000, and the Little Horde about 900,000, while the three together would make up from 2,000,000 to 2,400,000 persons of both sexes.

Chapter II. Division of the People.

- 631 No matter what differences in origin are attributed to the tribes which make up the nation of the Kazaks, they have all been fused into a single people living in the same country, which [301] in olden times was subject to a single chief. The proof of this is in the language, the religion, the customs, and the habits, which are everywhere the same.

The traditions confirm this, adding further that at the death of one of their khans, who had reigned over the entire nation, three sons divided it among themselves, and that according to the order of birth of their respective chiefs, these three divisions

[301 cont.]

643 adopted the names of the Great (1), the Middle, and the Little
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1. The other hordes regard the Great
Horde as the oldest.

161 Horde. Tradition also has it that the difference in population of
631 the groups was caused by war and varying success, and as the
divisions gradually increased, each one divided into several descent
lines which took the names of their chiefs or kept the names of
their ancient ancestors, such as the Naimans, the Kipchaks, etc.
The descent lines were subdivided in turn into tribes, and the
latter into sections, the sections into branches, and the branches
into parts. It is almost impossible to enumerate all these sub-
divisions. The work necessary (2) for such an enterprise would

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2. What zeal and love for genealogy
one would need to have to decide to verify
and examine the reports of the Kazaks!
One says that his tribe is divided into five
or six sections. Another asserts that it is
divided into twelve. A [302] third confuses
the sections of his tribe with those of the
neighboring tribes. Finally, a fourth, who
is more honest than any of the others, frankly
admits his ignorance.

require too much patience and, above all, a long sojourn among
the Kazaks, not only in every tribe or section, but also in every
part of a section.

621 Thus we will limit ourselves to enumerating the descent
631 lines and the tribes, beginning with the Little Horde, as the
611 closest to Europe. We base ourselves on Tевкеlev's memoirs
[114] written more than a century ago. (See the historical section
[not translated]). In the opinion of the Kazaks themselves, the
information contained in these memoirs is worthy of the greatest
confidence, both by their precision and by the circumstances under
which they were written.

[303 cont.]

The Great Horde

631 The Great Horde originally was composed of the Uisiun or
619 Usiun, Tulatai, and Sargam descent lines. Later the Konrat or
611 Kunrat descent line detached itself from the Middle Horde and
joined the Great Horde.

From these first descent lines the following tribes issued:
Botboi, Chimir, Djanis or Yanysh, Sik-Am, Abdai-Suvank, [304]
Sary-Suly, Chanych-Kily, Kanly or Kankly, Djalair, etc.

II. The Konkhrat descent line formed the following tribes:
Bailar-Djandjar, Uras-Geldy, Kuldjegach, Bochman, Tok-Bulat,
Yaman-Bai, Kura-Kusia, Etimlier, Kuyush-Kansyz.

Each of the tribes is divided into sections. A section is
composed of parts, and the latter also have their subdivisions,
and all have different names. For example, the Maskar tribe
of the Baiuly (in the Little Horde) descent line has two sections,
namely: Kutlu-Gadam and Massak. The Kutlu-Gadam section is
made up of two parts called Kurman and Baba-Nasar. The
Kurman part has three subdivisions, which are Atamkan, Umier,
and Kudaigul. The Baba-Nazar part has two subdivisions: Abdu-
Shokur and Djidik.

661 What a volume the names of all these subdivisions for the
178 three hordes would make! Without wearying the reader with such
an enumeration, it will suffice to say that the increase of popula-
tion among the Kazaks is constantly giving rise to new subdivisions,
and that the original names of the descent lines will end up by
being lost. In this manner, the Baiuly and Alimuly have ceased to
bear their generic name of Alchin. It also develops from this that
there are Kazaks who do not know what descent line they belong
to and know only the name of their tribe and their section.

It can be concluded that in a hundred years most of the
names of the Kazak branches which we have cited will no longer
exist except in the Russian archives and in the memory of a few
old men.

565 In addition, these subdivisions concern only the common
611 people. The upper class has another genealogy. This is why
643 the Kazaks divide themselves into two estates, the White bone

/Between pp. 176 and 177/

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BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million—nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival—at once political, religious, and cultural in nature—became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage—industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed in many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

- 121 reasonably be expected to persist over time and which indicate probable vulnerabilities to psychological warfare.

COMMUNICATIONS

Because psychological warfare depends ultimately upon the ability to communicate, the existing patterns and facilities for communication have been given considerable attention in the report. These data are concerned not only with radio communications, literacy rates, and similar factors of importance in communicating from a distance, but also with motion pictures and book publishing, which are important during consolidation operations. Such scanty data as are available are given on the distribution of ethnic groups in the republic as a whole and within cities, a matter of importance in helping to define the limits of informal or word-of-mouth communication. Even more scanty, but highly important, are the few available indications of the direction and amount of uncontrolled flow of Turkic peoples back and forth between the USSR and Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.

COLLECTIVIZATION

- 181 Among the many characteristics of Kazakh culture which have stood
221 in the way of successful adaptation to Soviet policy, their centuries-old dedication to a life of pastoral nomadism has consistently created the most acute problems—problems which became disastrous for the Kazakhs during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. For generations the Kazakhs had led their flocks of sheep and goats in a yearly round between winter and summer grazing areas, traveling in bands whose members were united by bonds of kinship and led by the senior men. Like so many nomads they were proud of their way of life and viewed agriculture and the sedentary life it implies as both unmanly and degrading. The small amount of farming which was occasionally done was performed by women, who have always occupied a subordinate position in Kazakh society, and by slaves and the poor.

- 242 The determination of the Soviet regime to settle the Kazakhs, along
564 with the other peoples of the USSR, on collective farms met with resist-
567 ance and cost hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs their livelihood and their lives. The net loss in Kazakh population in the period 1926-1939 amounted to almost one million; if one takes into account the normal increase otherwise to be expected during this time (based on figures for the USSR as a whole) the figure is closer to one and a half million.

Some compromises were made during the later phases of collectivization, but the basic conflict remains and manifests itself in a number of different ways. The Kazakhs are among those affected by a plan for massive cultural change which the Soviets believe will eventually create a society uniformly organized in accordance with "socialist reality." Thus far, however, cultural change in Kazakhstan has failed in many ways to proceed according to plan.

Chapter 2

A DEMOGRAPHIC SKETCH¹

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It is the history of the population trends of the Kazakhs which singles this people out for study among all the peoples of Central Asia. Comparison of the two censuses which the Soviets have published, in 1926 and in 1939, shows that the Kazakhs suffered severe population losses between those years. Longer-term trends show that they constitute an ever-decreasing proportion of the people living in their native land. These population factors are of immediate interest in the study of the Kazakhs, but in addition it is obvious that the history of a people is closely related to the fate of its numbers, their growth and decline, and the possible causes one can find for these trends.

KAZAKHS PRIOR TO 1917

The Kazakh population figures indicate great oscillations over the past century; great increases are followed by sharp dips. Close study of these demographic trends should reveal many clear reflections of Kazakh internal developments and relations with other peoples—their neighbors and conquerors.

[649] The first estimates of the numerical strength of the Kazakhs appeared shortly after the Russian penetration into Turkestan early in the 19th century. At that time the Russians had not yet conquered all the Kazakhs; many peoples of Central Asia, including part of the Kazakhs, were still either semi-independent, living in the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, or else under Chinese rule. Early Russian travelers, explorers, commercial agents, and intelligence agents began to bring back information about the Kazakhs, including population estimates.

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113 Space for reporting the study of Kazakh demography is limited. In the few pages of this report devoted to this rich topic only a few of the many data and analyses available can be introduced. During the past few years, Dr. Frank Lorimer has directed the study of Kazakh demography by Miss Faye Goldware and Mr. John Grauman (89). The reports on Kazakh demography prepared by and under Dr. Lorimer are available at the Bureau of Social Science Research and at the Bureau of the Census. The contents of this chapter have drawn heavily upon the work of these persons, and for fuller treatment and documentation of the topic the reader is directed to their writings. Responsibility for the conclusions drawn and for the formulations in this chapter rests, of course, only with those who have contributed to this report.

Most of these early estimates were phrased in terms of number of Kazakh households. Assuming an average of five persons per household, one can derive such figures as the following for the number of Kazakhs in the Russian empire in the 19th century: 1,850,000 in 1824, 2,000,000 in 1832, and 2,200,000 in 1871. The 1897 Census, which included all but a few thousand Kazakhs resident in China, gave the Kazakh population as 3,800,000. This was the only 19th century estimate with any claim to accuracy. 161

These estimates indicate a general consistency to the population trends of the 19th century. The increase occurred despite a series of wars of liberation, rebellions, and other evidences of unrest; this was the era of the Kazakh wars and uprisings against the Russians. [68]

The rapid increase which started in the last three decades of the 19th century continued into the beginning of the 20th. In 1911 the number of Kazakhs living within the Russian empire was estimated at 4,400,000, an increase of 13.6 per cent in 14 years.

From the beginning of the 19th century, then, when the earliest extensive Russian investigation of Central Asia took place, to the eve of World War I the Kazakh population approximately doubled. The rate of increase appears to have been low at the beginning of the period, rising toward the end.

KAZAKHS IN THE 1926 CENSUS

According to the 1926 Census of the Soviet Union, there were 3,970,000 Kazakhs in the USSR. Of these, some 3,700,000 lived in Kazakhstan (comprising 57% of the population of the republic) and 270,000 outside the republic.

The absolute drop from 1911 to 1926 was thus 430,000, or nearly 10 per cent of the Kazakh population. This loss reflects the political conditions of the time. The relatively peaceful period prior to World War I, which had permitted the increase from 1897 to 1911, was followed by a Kazakh uprising in 1916, then by the Russian Revolution and civil war. In the years after the civil war, 1922-1926, improved conditions allowed the Kazakhs to recover to a point slightly exceeding their 1897 number but still considerably below the population estimate of 1911. [68]

In 1926 the great majority of the Kazakhs still maintained their traditional economy of herding. Seventy per cent of all economically active Kazakhs were reported as herders, 27 per cent as agriculturalists (largely mixed farming, i.e., with some herding mixed in), and less than 3 per cent in all other economic activities (such as industrial and white-collar work). 162

Of the 783,000 Kazakh households in Kazakhstan, 205,000 or 26 per cent were permanently settled. While this figure was based only on Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, it agrees with the total farming percentage. Agriculture is a sedentary way of life; approximately the same proportion of total Kazakhs were reported as occupied in agriculture as were reported as sedentary in Kazakhstan. [361]

THE PERIOD 1926-1939

At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border, into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

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161 may be estimated at approximately 1,400,000, if one adds to the actual loss of 900,000 the expected natural increase of 500,000.

648 A number of arguments have been advanced to account for both the actual and the estimated losses. Each has a certain merit, and no single one of them should be pursued at the expense of all the others.

[67] The Soviet explanation is that people from Kazakhstan moved away to the new industrial enterprises of the southern Urals and southern Siberia and to the neighboring Central Asia republics, the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's. This interpretation has not been accompanied by any data. The figures quoted here have been the totals of those listed as Kazakhs in the USSR censuses regardless of place of residence. Therefore, the Soviet statement must mean not only that hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs migrated from Kazakhstan to other parts of the USSR, but also that they gave up their Kazakh nationality in doing so.

[177] This may be part of the story but it cannot be the whole. It is known that the Russians looked with favor on the Russification of native populations and their absorption into the Russian ethnic group, regardless of their forebears. German and Austrian prisoners of war who were sent to Kazakhstan report that many Kazakhs, identifiable by their physiognomy, by their personal and family names, and by their own account of their past, were nevertheless designated Russian in their official papers. 161 But certainly 900,000 of them did not become Russian.

648 During the course of collectivization many Kazakhs were liquidated by the GPU, primarily during the period between the two censuses. [474] Those liquidated were people who resisted collectivization, but they were listed as remnants of the former nobility and wealthy people of Kazakhstan. This class was known as the feudal bays. [55] About 700 bay families per year were liquidated, that is turned over to the GPU, during the three-year period 1928-1930. In 1931 it was announced that 23,000 households of bays were to be liquidated. This made an announced total of 25,000 households subject to GPU measures. If all these people were actually liquidated (that is, left to starve or otherwise badly treated), then some 125,000 Kazakhs were eliminated by these means. This is the largest figure for population losses that can be assigned to police measures on the basis of published data.

[233] It has been stated that between 1930 and 1935, at the height of the drive for collectivization, the number of Kazakh households engaged in the traditional herding occupation dropped from 567,000 to 158,000. [162] Many of these households went into agriculture and some into industry in Kazakhstan, but others moved across the border, either into neighboring republics or out of the Soviet realm into bordering China. [167] During the 1920's and the first part of the 1930's considerable cross-border movement was still permitted into China and back, according to age-old nomadic patterns. The border was closed in the mid-1930's, and possibly some Kazakhs remained outside the USSR by choice; for example, there is a colony of approximately 30,000 Kazakhs in Outer Mongolia. However, to assign numbers to the population loss in Soviet Kazakhstan through this cross-border movement is a hopeless task.

Again, no reliable estimate has been given for the number of Kazakhs who might have gone over to the neighboring republics within the Soviet Union.

the Soviet Union. Traditionally, peoples of Central Asia were able to leave their native pastures when times were bad and claim hospitality among other more fortunate Turkic groups. Instances have been reported in the 19th and 20th centuries of groups of Kazakhs whose herds had been depleted through drought or plague doing this; some even joined Uzbek groups, on the basis of descent from a common ancestor. Such an argument would hold only for the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpak. It is not applicable to the Tadzhiks, and certainly not to the Russians. According to a long-established cultural pattern, Kazakhs who leave herding for farming join another group, such as Sart, for example, or Karakalpak, according to the area in which they have settled. 648
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[731]

The general consideration of shifts in ethnic identification raises the problem of the smaller peoples of Central Asia. Aside from the many millions of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kirgiz, there are various small groups, none of which number more than fifty-odd thousand. These smaller groups, who together number about one quarter of a million people, have suffered the same fate of cultural levelling, absorption, and elimination of cultural differences that has taken place throughout the Soviet world from the Caucasus to the Bering Sea. The cost of administering many small peoples is too great a luxury for the USSR to afford; the Soviets have ceased to regard these peoples as independent entities, and have awarded the highest honors to those ethnologists who have justified the formation of ever larger groups of peoples. 648

In 1928 more than 200,000 Kazakhs lived within the 1939 boundaries of Uzbekistan, exclusive of the Karakalpak ASSR, and 89,000 Kazakhs were living in what is today Karakalpakia. The Karakalpak are a people closely related to the Kazakhs; they are in the main Kazakhs who a few centuries ago settled down to farming. They still maintain strong ethnic ties to the Kazakhs, and linguistically are barely distinguishable from them. The Karakalpak increased from 146,000 to 186,000 between 1928 and 1939, an increase of 27 per cent and the highest gain of all the Central Asiatic peoples during that period. Part of this gain may have been due to the decision of Kazakhs to declare themselves Karakalpak, or the decision of the census authorities to list the Kazakhs as Karakalpak. The latter alternative is implausible, because it would have the Soviets contributing further to a population picture of the Kazakhs which was already unfavorable. Marxist theory rejects the capitalistic Malthusian concept, and extreme population losses are embarrassing for the Communists to explain. 648
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From 1929 to 1933 the total livestock in Kazakhstan dropped from nearly 40,000,000 to 5,000,000 head. This was a disastrous blow to the nomads. The number of sheep and goats dropped by about 90 per cent. More than two-thirds of the horses and three-quarters of the cattle died in those years; between 1930 and 1933 more than 90 per cent of the camels died. Without these animals, the nomads cannot live. The farmer can store his grain, but the nomad can store food only on the hoof. When a head of stock dies on the steppes either it is eaten or it rots. The nomad's staple is milk, which he cannot store. These losses in livestock give some idea of the starvation conditions which prevailed during 1930-1933. Hundreds of thousands of nomads must either have 731
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161 died or changed their way of life. This fact lies behind the great drop in the number of Kazakh nomadic households, from 567,000 in 1930 to one-fourth that amount, 158,000, in 1935.

It will be recalled that between 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population suffered an absolute loss of 900,000, and a projected loss of 1,400,000, figured on the 15.9 average rate of increase for the entire Soviet Union. The major factors which contributed to this decline may now be summarized:

- [165] (1) Starvation through loss of herds during the period of the first great collectivization drive, 1929-1933.
- (2) The poor conditions of life and the prevalence of famine and disease during the early period of collectivization.
- (3) Mass arrests and liquidations of resisters to collectivization ("enemies of the people").
- [167] (4) Border crossings by Kazakhs into Sinkiang and Mongolia.
- (5) Kazakh migration to the neighboring Turkic peoples, primarily the Karakalpakhs and the Uzbeks.
- [177] (6) Russification of Kazakhs who moved to the new urban developments of southern Siberia.

The population losses in any single category cannot be estimated with accuracy; one can only list those factors contributing to population loss with comments about their relative significance. The major factor was undoubtedly starvation through loss of herds and through the conditions attending collectivization. The flight across the borders into countries outside the USSR is a dramatic factor, but not one which accounts for large numbers. There are no signs of a great increase in the population of Sinkiang, for example, in the early 1930's. The total population of Sinkiang is small, and an influx of hundreds of thousands of people could not have passed unnoticed, especially since there were western observers in the area at the time.

The movement of Kazakhs into the cities of southern Siberia, presumably in the Urals and the Kuzbass, is the official Russian explanation. This explanation cannot be the whole story but must be accepted as a part of the truth. That is, Kazakhs who are urbanized, speak Russian habitually, and work in Russian factories seek a Russian nationality listing. They have been encouraged to do so at certain periods of Soviet history, primarily in the 1930's.

[165] The factor of GPU arrests and liquidation, together with attendant factors such as starvation among those who were not themselves liquidated but whose herds were, may account for a maximum of 125,000 Kazakhs. The last major factor is the flight of Kazakhs to other neighboring nationalities. A minor factor related to this last is the low rate of increase among those Kazakhs resident in areas outside Kazakhstan.

KAZAKH POPULATION IN 1939

161 A total of 3,100,000 Kazakhs was listed for the USSR as a whole in
131 the 1939 census. Approximately 84 per cent were resident in Kazakhstan, nearly 10 per cent lived in Uzbekistan and Karakalpakia, and the rest

were settled in other neighboring republics. In 1926 the Kazakhs had numbered just slightly less than 4,000,000, of whom 93 per cent lived within the 1926 boundaries of Kazakhstan. There had been important shifts in the territory of the Kazakh republic during the interval—in some cases territory was added, in others taken away. The total area in 1926 was 2,850,000 square kilometers; in 1939 it was 2,730,000, a reduction of 4.2 per cent. Table 1 summarizes the 1926 and 1939 population figures.

Table 1

TOTAL AND KAZAKH POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN,
1926 AND 1939

Year	Total Population of KSSR	Number of Kazakhs in KSSR	Kazakh Per Cent of Total Population
1926	6,503,000	3,710,000	57
1926 (1939 boundaries)	6,074,000	3,468,000	57
1939	6,146,000	2,640,000	43

In 1926, Kazakhs constituted a majority of the population of Kazakhstan (57%); by 1939, they had shrunk to 43 per cent. This change in the ratio of Kazakhs to non-Kazakhs is due in part to the decrease in number of Kazakhs, and in part to the migration of Russians into the republic. In 1926 there were about 2,500,000 non-Kazakhs within the 1939 boundaries of Kazakhstan. The number of such persons had increased by 1939 to approximately 3,550,000. Natural increase could have caused only part of this growth; migration of peoples into the republic must have been responsible for most of it. This influx must also have exceeded the movement of non-Kazakhs to the new industrial developments in southern Siberia.

This migration into Kazakhstan consisted largely of urban and industrial workers. Kirov, one of Stalin's aides in the early 1930's, initiated the policy of resettling thousands of Russians from the Leningrad region to build the industrial area around Karaganda. A second wave of migration took place during World War II, when again many people from the factories of Leningrad and Moscow and the mines of the Don basin were moved to Kazakhstan.

According to Soviet sources, Kazakhs and Russians (exclusive of Ukrainians and Belo-Russians) made up 80 per cent of the population of Kazakhstan in 1939. If 43 per cent is the correct figure for the Kazakh proportion of the total population at that time, then the Russians constituted approximately 37 per cent of the whole, or about 2,275,000, and the Kazakhs numbered about 2,650,000.

The urban population more than tripled between the two censuses, growing from 519,000 to 1,706,000, from 8.5 to 28 per cent of the whole. Slightly more than 800,000 were located in the seven major cities of the republic, those with populations greater than 50,000 in 1939. This increase by 3.3 times exceeded the average rate of urban increase for

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162 the USSR as a whole. Yet the total population of Kazakhstan remained virtually static, increasing by only 72,000 from 1926 to 1939 within the 1939 boundaries, an increase of 1.2 per cent. The rural population, however, decreased by more than a million, from 5,550,000 to 4,440,000. This comparison of rural and urban population figures summarizes the chief economic trends of the period: the loss of farmers and herdsmen through starvation, liquidation, and migration and the growth of the cities through the influx of industrial workers.

KN 161 [20] DEVELOPMENTS IN KAZAKHSTAN TO 1954

It is difficult to make accurate estimates of Soviet population since the 1939 census, but methods have been devised for making estimates. Through figures for school registrations and for numbers of voters and voting districts, one can derive some idea of postwar Kazakh population trends (Table 2).

Table 2

ESTIMATED RECENT TRENDS IN THE POPULATION OF KAZAKHSTAN*

Year	Population Estimate	Per Cent Increase Over Previous Estimate
1948 (January)	6,560,000	6.7 ^b
1950 (December)	6,800,000	3.8
1954 (March)	7,200,000	5.9

*Estimated through voting district analysis.

^bPer cent increase over the 1939 figure of 6,150,000.

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[54] The 1939-1948 period showed an over-all population increase in Kazakhstan of 6.7 per cent. Since this period included the war years, losses due to the war were apparently compensated for by natural increase and migration into the republic. Possibly by 1948 some of those who had moved into Kazakhstan during the war had returned to their former homes. One example of this was the film industry, which established itself almost completely in Alma-Ata during the war, but which had returned to Moscow and Leningrad by 1948.

The total estimated increase in population from 1939 to 1954 amounted to approximately one million. Forty per cent of this increase occurred in the nine-year period from 1939 to 1948, and 60 per cent of it in the remaining six years. The higher rate of increase during the more recent years is plausible, because of the elimination of the losses due to the war and to the movement out of the republic in the years 1946-1947. There is evidence of continued migration into Kazakhstan to the present day, in addition to natural increase, but it would be difficult to assign relative weights to these two factors.

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[61] If the preceding estimates of the total population of Kazakhstan are correct, and if the percentage of Kazakhs in the population remained at the estimate for 1939 (43%), then the number of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan

during the postwar period may be estimated as follows: 2,800,000 in 1948, 2,900,000 in 1950, and 3,100,000 in 1954. However, there is good reason to believe that this ratio of 43 per cent no longer holds true. Heavy Slavic migration into the republic since 1939 has probably increased the proportion of non-Kazakhs, even though the Kazakhs may have had a higher birth rate. Secondly, if the Kazakhs constituted 43 per cent of the 1954 population, they must necessarily have increased by more than 20 per cent of their 1939 number. This seems unlikely, in view of the losses and the probable reduction in birth rate during the war. It seems most probable, then, that the proportion of Kazakhs has decreased to a ratio somewhat below 40 per cent of the total population of Kazakhstan.

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WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF KAZAKHS

According to a Soviet estimate in 1939 there were about 400,000 Kazakhs outside the USSR, who together with the 3,100,000 resident in the Soviet Union made a total of 3,500,000. Those outside the Soviet Union lived in Sinkiang and in western Mongolia, with scattered thousands in Afghanistan, Iran, Kashmir, and Turkey. Numerical data on these Kazakhs are even scarcer than on those within the USSR.

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Appendix A

PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF RESEARCH¹

The Bureau of Social Science Research, in agreeing to compose a background report on the Kazakhs for the Human Resources Research Office, regarded the report as a pilot study. The participants in the project had no guidelines other than broadly conceived research techniques such as are generally used in Soviet studies. The application of the results to the purposes of psychological warfare was in fact worked out in the course of the study. The Kazakhs presented additional difficulties because less is known in the United States about them than about, say, the Ukrainians, the Great-Russians, or other nationalities of the European parts of the Soviet Union. An interdisciplinary team was put together to meet these problems. 121

The primary function of the study was to provide a rounded picture of the Kazakhs and of the changes they were undergoing under the Soviets. Since these people live in an area ordinarily inaccessible, problems in information gathering had to be solved, as well as the more usual problems concerning interpretation and evaluation of data. The source materials to be drawn upon were scattered and had never previously been surveyed. The problem of sources will be described in the last part of this methodological survey, for it is a matter closely connected to the nature of the report and bears upon its value. 127

It is generally agreed that Soviet information may be used to compose a picture of life in the Soviet Union. Where Soviet information is not propaganda it is as reliable as similar information anywhere else, and where it is propaganda it is readily identifiable as such. The quantitative information is not as complete as it might be, but there is enough of it to permit evaluation and cross-checking. 121

The present statement on methods concerns itself with two problems: one, the contributions of various disciplines and their integration into a meaningful picture of Kazakh life; and the other, the sources of information, their scope and content.

DEMOGRAPHY

Attention had been drawn to the Kazakhs because of a striking demographic fact about them: They had suffered a severe population loss between 1926 and 1939. The techniques of demographic analysis would have been applied to them in any case but only as a secondary line of inquiry. In the Kazakh research, however, demography came to have a central place. This study had as its target the demarcation of vulnerabilities to psychological warfare, and common sense alone would suggest that a large population loss might well leave lasting vulnerabilities. 121
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¹By Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research.

128 The official Soviet explanation of the Kazakh population loss serves
 161 to call attention to the problems of demographic method as applied in this case. The only known reference by the Soviets to the matter of Kazakh losses is related to the development of industry in Soviet Asia. The loss of Kazakhs is laid to the growth of industry in areas neighboring on Kazakhstan, primarily the growth of industrial towns and cities in the southern Urals (Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk) and in southern Siberia (Novosibirsk, the Kuzbass, etc.). This statement implies a movement of Kazakhs from their native steppes to the cities to join in industry, thereby giving up their Kazakhdom. By shifting from the steppes to the factories and mines they became Russified and were, so the implication runs, listed as Russians in the 1939 census.

This simple explanation of a seemingly complex matter immediately arouses suspicion. The official Soviet explanation addresses itself only to the growth of industry, which is a positive merit in the Soviet scheme. Hence, one wonders whether a negative fact, a possible source of embarrassment to the Soviet propagandist, is being counterbalanced by a positive fact, the growth of industry.

Investigation of the population loss revealed a complex problem which no single explanation could resolve. The Kazakhs numbered 3,968,289 in the census of December 1926, and 3,098,764 in the census of January 1939. The loss in the 13-year period was thus almost 900,000, or 22 per cent. This figure, moreover, refers only to the physical or absolute loss, and the problem is broader than that. The Kazakhs would have been reproducing themselves during that period. For an understanding of the dynamics of possible population growth, an insight may be gained from comparison with a neighboring people. The Kirgiz are Turks just as the Kazakhs are. The traditional occupation of both is the raising of herds; both are natives of Central Asia, and have been for many centuries. The Kirgiz, living under different conditions in the Soviet period, increased by some 16 per cent during the 1926-1939 period while the Kazakhs were decreasing. The Kirgiz rate of increase was about the average for the entire Soviet Union. With a similar population increase, there would have been 4,600,000 Kazakhs by 1939, instead of 3,100,000. Thus one is faced with a projected loss of about 1,500,000. It is this projected population figure which we must deal with, rather than the actual. Of this, no mention is made in the Soviet literature.

129 A fuller understanding of the Kazakh population loss was gained by an intensive examination of Kazakh history, especially in the 19th century. In the light of their past record, the reactions of the Kazakhs to the process of Sovietization became comprehensible. In this process the Kazakhs, traditionally herdsmen, were forced into collective farms and were required to perform tasks contrary to their traditions and beliefs. The population loss was traced to resistance to collectivization, with attendant mass arrests, flight across the borders, mass starvation, and death; to poor organization of collectives; and finally, to industrialization and Russification.

ANTHROPOLOGY: THE PROBLEM OF ACCULTURATION

121 The interpretation of what Sovietization means involves a broader
 177 methodological problem than the Kazakh question alone. One of the writers of the report had advanced the theory that in Sovietizing a people, the leaders of the USSR were performing what may be referred to as controlled acculturation. Acculturation in anthropology refers to

-380-

175 However that may be, they continue to appear as one people a century later, and their present division into three hordes dates only from the 17th century. However, even after the Kazakhs had been divided into three hordes, they were united from time to time under mighty Khans, such as Khan Tiavka in 1698.³³ But at the beginning of the 18th century the three hordes were definitively separated.

[177] During their occupation of the steppes of Turkestan the Kazakhs have been at a constant state of war with the Kalmuks,³⁴ but they have interacted with the Kalmuks, or the western Mongols generally, on other levels as well: they have also intermarried with them, and some of the implications of this will be taken up below.

- 16) The Kazakhs in toto combined to form the second most numerous Turkic population in the world³⁵ at the end of the 19th century; this condition existed before that time, and is the case today as well. Levshin, whose data were gathered about the year 1830, reported the following population for the Kazakhs: a combined total in all the hordes of about 400,000 tents or families, which was to be multiplied according to Levshin

³³Barthold, Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. Kazak.

³⁴Spuler, 355-357.

³⁵Aristov, Zametki, 380.

-381-

16/ by five or six individuals per family or tent, making
a total population of 2 to 2.4 millions.³⁶ The latter
figure must be questioned, because few serious writers
on the Kazakhs estimate more than five per conjugal
family, that is, three children. Aristov estimates
for one of the herdes an average of four to five peo-
ple per conjugal family, which seems more reasonable.
Von Hellwald likewise implies an average of four per
tent.³⁷ Radloff puts the total Kazakh population dur-
ing the 1870's at about 2 million, i.e., at about the
same figure as the lower and more credible estimate of
Levshin a half century earlier.³⁸ Kostenko published
a report on Central Asia in 1871 and in it gave a fig-
ure of 2.5 million for the Kazakhs,³⁹ which allows for
some natural increase. So much for the more or less
impressionistic estimates. In the census of 1897,
there were approximately 4.08 million Kazakhs regis-
tered,⁴⁰ while in the 1926 census there were 4 million,⁴¹
thus yielding a static picture during a thirty-year
period according to the sources in which formal census-

³⁶Levshin, 300.

³⁷Aristov, loc. cit.; Hellwald, 20.

³⁸Radloff, Aus Sibirien, I, 235.

³⁹Kostenko, 31.

⁴⁰D. Elements, Kirgizy, 143.

⁴¹Lorimer, 58.

-382-

161 taking techniques were applied. In a more general way, we may derive a rate of net increase of 100 percent per century, which is not unthinkable; nevertheless it must be noted that there is a vast disparity between the accuracy of the 19th century figures prior to the 1897 census, and those of the 1897 and 1926 censuses.

619 The Kazakhs have been divided into three hordes or
175 chief administrative-political units which have been in-
642 dependent of each other since the beginning of the 18th century; these are known as the Great Horde, the Middle Horde and the Little Horde. At the beginning of the 19th century, after the flight of the Kalmyks from the Volga steppes to western China, the territory left free to the east of the Volga was given into the hands of Khan Bukel of the Little Horde. In making this move, under the protection of the Russian government, Khan Bukel formed the Bukel or Inner horde. Thus, during the 19th century there were effectively four hordes of the Kazakhs. The move by Bukel took place during the years 1801-1802,⁴² and his followers numbered about 7000 tents. There is evidence of considerable movement in the western steppe in this period, since it is also reported that shortly before some 3200 tents or families of the Kazakhs had submitted to the Russians by crossing the Irtysh and settling there.⁴³ Again, many of these who had followed

⁴²Levchine, 299-300.

⁴³Kostenko, 30.

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173 social bodies.

These are groups in which the oral tradition predominates. The learned elder who expounds their genealogy to his followers and kinsmen has not invented it; he learned it from his father, who learned it from his. The oral tradition is the means whereby the genealogy is transmitted; the oral tradition is the larger genre, the repository of the integrative forces of Kazakh--and Mongol and Turkic--social life generally. The oral tradition includes more than the genealogy alone; it includes, for example, the folk-epic of the Turke and the Mongols. In order to understand what the oral tradition, genealogical and folk-epic, is, one might look to see where it is not: it does not exist among the Chinese. Chinese society has other means than that of the Altaic-speakers of the steppe whereby it has established its existence as such.

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121 The numerical strength of the Botpay clan was a total of 2465 tents or families, or a total of some 10,000 individuals. It was formed of two major or maximal lineages, the Kudaykul, totalling 743 tents, and the Chagatay, totalling 1722 tents. The Kudaykul was in turn composed of three sub-lineages, the Bish-insuk, 315 tents; the Alym-Djanya, 221 tents; and the Siirchi, 207 tents. The Chagatay was composed of six minor or sub-lineages: the Isenbay, 275 tents; the Djankoilkyk, 330 tents; the Asan-Taylak, 537 tents; the Akcha-Kodjay,

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385 tents; the Bldas, 80 tents; and the Kuralash, 115⁵⁸ tents. The total configuration is more or less the same as that of another clan of the Great Horde, the Seikym clan, which was composed of four major lineages ranging in size from 150 to 625 families.⁵⁹ Both the Botpay and the Seikym inhabited the easternmost portion of the steppe of the Great Horde, in the region of the Ala-Tau mountains, close to the Chinese border, and they formed two of the four clans which together comprised the⁶⁰ Dulat division of the Great Horde.

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Under normal conditions, such were the limits within which lineage size and clan size tended to vary. Some twenty to thirty years later, after the conquest of the region by the Russians under General Kaufman, a marked tendency to increase the size of the basic group set in. Radlov records figures for the administrative units that now replaced the clans, which although corresponding roughly with them, are in some instances significantly greater. In size, the clans of the Great Horde were now distributed as follows: eight of them contained between 330 and 890 families; twelve comprised between 1050 and 3500 families; three were between 5350⁶¹ and 12,000 families (or tents) strong. In the inter-

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58Ibid., 395.

59Ibid., 326.

60Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, 368.

61Radloff, Aus Sibirien, I, 238-240.

-397-

[Great Horde]

- 100 Balkhash, and extending into Chinese Turkestan as well.
- 161 Its territory was the greatest of the hordes, but its population was the smallest of all the hordes during the 19th century. ⁶³ Their total number is estimated at about 110,000 families, or about 440,000 individuals in ⁶⁴ the past third of the 19th century.

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⁶¹⁹ In the structure of the Great Horde there are traces of a dual organisation, the division of the horde into an eastern wing and a western. The eastern wing was in turn divided into two subdivisions, which were together comprised of seven clans. The western wing was further subdivided directly into ten clans. ⁶⁵ It would be difficult to justify the term moiety in connection with the two wings, and the more neutral theoretical concept of dual organisation, only traces of which are detectable, will be used. In his analysis of the moiety, Lowie attributes the functioning of the principle of exogamy to this unit. ⁶⁶ However, a more important reason for the choice of the neutral term dual organisation is the lack of distinctive functions of the two great divisions. Dichotomies within the steppe society occur sporadically,

⁶³ Radloff, Aus Sibirien, I, 235.

⁶⁴ Aristov, Opyt vyiasneniia, 398-400.

⁶⁵ Radloff, op. cit., I, 235.

⁶⁶ Lowie, Primitive Society, 118.

-456-

672 Moreover, the family acted as a personality in paying
681 or receiving the wergeld: it was liable to penalty or
573 indemnity as a unit. To this conception we add in cor-
roboration the family as a personality in the marriage
practices of kalyu, levirate and the marriage agreement
itself.

The Middle Horde

101 The Middle Horde, Kazakh orta yds, literally Middle
161 Hundred, nomadized on the steppe north of Lake Balkhash
as far as the upper course of the Irtysh River in south-
ern Siberia. From the viewpoint of European Russia, it
was less distantly removed than the Great Horde. In ter-
ritorial expanse the Middle Horde was smaller than the
Great Horde, but larger than the combined Little and
Inner Hordes. Numerically it was the largest of all the
hordes considered separately in the 19th century; it was
estimated in the 1830's at 165,000 families, approxi-
mately, and at about the same number at the end of the
century. Thus from Levshin's day in the 1830's to Rad-
lov's in the 1890's, it showed no absolute change at all,
whether of increase or decrease, while compared with the
other hordes it had suffered a relative decrease. 166

220 Unlike the Great Horde, the Middle Horde had no

¹⁶⁶ Levchine, 300; von Hellwald, 20; von Lebedour, II, 480; Schuyler, I, 34; Lansdell, I, 303-304.

-463-

[Little Horde]

631 divided into seven clans. The foregoing is the version
 616 given by Radloff.¹⁷² Aristov, on the other hand, reports
 619 simply the existence of ten clans in the Little Horde,
 and mentions no more inclusive groupings than these. One
 of his groups is named the Alchin, however.¹⁷³ Radloff
 further indicates that according to his data, the Alchyn
 were further subdivided into two sub-divisions, the Alim-
 uli and the Bai-uli, the Alim-uli again into six sub-
 units, and the Bai-uli into ten. A part of the Bai-uli
 broke away from the Little Horde, moved across the Ural
 River through an agreement between their leader Bukel
 and the Russians, and occupied the steppe between the
 Ural and the Volga which had formerly been the pasture
 land of the Kalmuks.¹⁷⁴

611 The elucidation of the functions of these greater
 619 divisions of Kasakh society,² the horde and its principal
 segments, are mentioned briefly in this context merely
 to indicate that the web which tied them together was a
 common patrilineal descent, traced back to immemorial
 time by oral tradition to a mythical ancestor. Eventu-
 ally all Kasakhs are agnatically related in this manner.

• 161 The combined Little and Inner Hordes numbered about
 190,000 families according to various estimates between

¹⁷²Radloff, op. cit., 237-241.

¹⁷³Aristov, op. cit., 350.

¹⁷⁴Radloff, op. cit., 237.

7 [cf. cit. 619, p. 462 - Analyst]

-464-

[Little Horde]

161 1876 and 1885; the Lesser Horde contained 150,000 to 175
160,000 families, and the Inner Horde about 30,000.

This represents about a 20 percent increase over the figure given for the Little Horde alone in 1830 of

177 160,000 families by Levshin.¹⁷⁶ The Little and Inner

Hordes were closest to European Russia, and had been the longest of all in close contact with the Russians; the degree of acculturation was not different in any marked manner from that of the Middle Horde Kazakhs.

Because of the readier accessibility of the Little Horde, however, we have fuller data on certain aspects of their social structure and kinship relations than we have for the more distantly situated hordes.

614 The clans of the Little Horde, as those of all the other hordes, were organized on the basis of patrilineal descent from a common ancestor; this ancestor sometimes gave his name to the clan; otherwise the clan name was drawn from the stock of names which are associated with glorious events, great traditions designed to inspire the Kazakh warriors to emulate those who bore that name in the past. One clan name in the Little Horde was Yappas, a derivation from the name Japhet, the son of Noah, who appears ever again in Kazakh etymologies; other clan

¹⁷⁵ Schuyler, I, 34; Lansdell, I, 303-304. The lower estimate is that of von Hellwald, 20. Schuyler and Lansdell gathered their materials through interviewing local officials.

¹⁷⁶ Levshin, 300.

[Inner Horde]

-492-

619 Khan Bukai¹_A was of the highest nobility in the Little
565 Horde: Chingis Khan figured in his genealogy; and his
more immediate ancestor some three or four generations
back had been Abul-Hafr; the last great Khan whose fame
was recognised by all the hordes of the Kasakhs. How-
ever, Bukai was not in the direct senior line from Abul-
Hafr, and hence was not among the chief rulers of the
Little Horde.

• 161 He and his followers, who were changed in status
from a clan some 1500 families strong, to a horde with
its independent Khan, increased naturally, through Russ-
ian support and the attraction of in-migrants to some
5000 families in five years, lost some groups through
defections in the 1820's,²²⁷ but increased steadily un-
til by 1845 they had come to number 30,000 families,²²⁸
which was the same number they had forty years later,
619 in the 1880's. The demographic history of the Inner
167 Horde reveals much of the instability of all social
formations, clans, lineages, hordes, villages, and even
extended families. Migration--as opposed to nomadisa-
tion--brought about ever new conjunctions and combina-
tions. Clans, villages, etc., had to survive not only
the mortal span of their individual members, but the
shifting of loyalties and membership affiliations as well.

²²⁷Levehins, 300.

²²⁸Ivanin, 6.

¹[i.e. the leader of the Inner Horde in the early
19th century. Cf. Catlin, AMH Mongolia, p. 471. - Analyst]

-495-

[Inner Horde]

413 and it was likewise important to know what the range
162 was within which these kin groupings fell. It is impor-

761] tant to know that the population density of the Bukel
Horde was 0.2 per sq. km. of their lands actually in
use for the greater part of the year, including their
own and leased lands; that the figure is slightly lower,
0.17 per sq. km., if the useless lands (arid, sandy,
salty, etc.) and the disputed lands (with the Ural or
New-Line Cossacks) are taken into account. 231 These
figures are not only of interest for demographic, eco-
nomic or ecological purposes; they are of interest in
the study of kinship, for they indicate the limits
within which close kin may be reckoned, they tell us
how low the number may fall before the lineage members
will seek to fuse with another group, and how high the
number may reach before the group will divide into two
or more by the process of fission. Thus, number itself
relates significantly to kinship principles and to so-
cial structural principles.

233 These numerical data⁴ must in their turn be brought
613 together with other data, to answer still further ques-
tions: were the Inner or Bukel Horde Kazakhs herders
like their Kalmuk, and Little Horde neighbors, like the
Khalkha Mongols, etc.? For example, two Bukel Horde
groups in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea in 1852 show

231 Ibid., 12.

4 [cf. cat. 11b, AH1 Mongolia, pp. 491-495 for
Context -- Analyst]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COSSACK COMMUNITIES 53

C.
433 is still at a primitive and wasteful stage. Then comes the cultivation of wine and tobacco plantations. The Asiatic Cossacks are well known as traders.

000 CONCLUSION.—Having traced the origin of these curious communities, followed their evolution, and seen something of their present state, I should now like to lay before you two momentous problems, one connected with the Kaizak, the other with the Cossacks, the solution of which is of vital importance to Eastern Europe and to Asia.

K.
101 The first problem arises out of the existence, the character, and the circumstances of the Turkic Kaizak (i.e., the Turkic Cossacks). They are a body who, despite their nomadic condition, have an importance not to be lightly estimated, for any cause, either within Russia or without, which has their support will be very considerably strengthened thereby. Numbering from four to five million, by no means thoroughly subjugated by Mongol or by Russian power, this half-nomadic race of the Kaizak, whom, as we saw, the Russians erroneously call Kirghis, represents a considerable fighting force in its own land, since its clan organization still remains strong. Lying between Europe and Asia, its country extends from the shore of the Caspian to Pamir, and is on the route to the fabulously rich mines of Altai and Sayan and the other wealth of Siberia.

K.
181 The Kaizak may be regarded as an advance-guard to the Turks of Bokhara, Khiva, and other countries of Turkestan, but their sympathies are detached, for although they have much in common with these Turks racially and linguistically, their want of strong feeling for Mahometanism sets them apart. This is hardly surprising, since Islam was only brought to them two centuries ago, and it has never been in them a driving cultural force. On the other hand, they have always been in opposition to the Central Russian Government, an opposition of which the rising of 1916 and its subsequent massacres is a recent proof.* Their relation to the Russian Cossacks has been that of an insubordinate native tribe to a conquering Russian army, and yet Russian Cossacks and Turkic Kaizak have more in common with each other than either have with the Central Russian Government. Wherever Russian Cossacks have settled among Turkic Kaizak, it is the latter who have kept the upper hand, the Russian Cossacks adopting their mode of life and social outlook. In disregarding their essential kinship, and fostering dissension between the Russian and the Turkic Cossacks, the old Russian Government made a grave mistake. Friendly feeling and friendly terms have grown up and been established between the Turkic Kaizak and the progressive element among the Siberian colonists, which is a consideration worth noticing. There are two alternatives before the Kaizak, one of which

* For a fuller account on the Turkic Kaizak, see M. A. Czaplicka's "Turks of Central Asia," now in preparation (Oxford University Press).

1: Barthold H-4 (no date) 1927

RP2 Kirgiz RP2

KAZAK RQ 2

Ka.
177

popular leader of the Kazak, Kenesarl, who fought against the authorities in Siberia and Orenburg from 1842, was killed in 1847 in the mountains of Ala Tau; several risings were stirred up down to 1873 by his son Sadik (so-called by the Russians, properly Siddik). Another son, Ahmad, later wrote the life of his father Kenesarl and of his brother Sadik, entitled: *Sultani Kenisara i Sadik. Biografiatskiye ocherki sultana Akhmeta Kenisarina. Obratovano dlye palati i snableno primclaniyami E. T. Smirnovam, Tashkent 1889*. Review by V. Rosen in *Zap.*, iv., p. 122 sq.

The most southern part of the Kirgiz steppes was conquered in the sixteenth century by the Ozbeks of Farghana and Khlwa and partly colonised; the advance of the Russians in this part was therefore assisted by the Kazak. After the foundation of the general-gouvernement of Turkestan (1867) and the general-gouvernement of the Steppes (1882), Semiretse belonged at first to the latter, but was later again united to Turkestan, the government of the Kirgiz steppes had less unity than before. On the other hand after the revolution an administrative unit was established called at first by the Russians the "Kirgiz Republic" and by the people themselves "Kazakistan"; since 1924 this "Republic" has included a vast territory, little smaller than Russia in Europe, but of course less thickly populated. According to the latest Russian figures before the revolution the Kazak numbered about 4,000,000 compared with about 500,000 genuine Kirgiz. The present numbers of the population cannot be very different from these. Culoshnikov's (see below) reckoning, by which the Kazak and true Kirgiz would now be about 8,500,000 together is certainly much too high. In the northern part of the Kirgiz steppes between 1920 and 1923 the population is known to have declined by 21.2%. According to figures in the official publication *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (1924, No. 8-9, p. 4), the population of the "Kirgiz Republic" is 6,536,000 including 4,008,310 Kirgiz (61.3%).

Ka
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Ki
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
The *Bibliography* of the Kirgiz is very large: see the attempts to collect it in A. Kharuzin (*Etnograf. Obozreniye*, 1891 and 1892) and A. Alektorow (*Izv. Obshch. Arkh. etc. Kazan*, xi. 1904). The fullest history of the Kirgiz steppes is that by A. Levshin, *Opisaniye Kirgiz-kaisakikh ord i stepei*, St. Petersburg 1832; this is supplemented by many quotations (especially from the *Tarikh-i Rashidi* and the *Abd Allah Nume*) in Welyaminow-Zernow, *Izskhodovaniya o kazimechikh tsaryakh i tsarevitsakh*, vol. ii. On the everyday life (esp. of the Kazak) in the sixteenth century: W. Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, 2nd ed., Leipzig 1893, vol. i.; do., *Proben der Volksliteratur etc.*, vol. iii. and v. On laws: N. Grodekow, *Kirgis i Kara-Kirgisel Sir-Daryinskoi Oblasti*, Tashkent 1889; review by N. Veselowsky in *Zap.*, v. 115 sqq. On present conditions: *Obzor narodnogo khozaystva Kirgizskoi A. S. S. R. 1924 god. Pod redaktsiyey J. P. Krutina*, Orenburg 1925. Later essays on the history of the Kirgiz: A. Culoshnikov, *Ocherki iz istorii Kazak-Kirgizskogo naroda*, Cast I. *Direrentsiya vremeni i sredniye veka*, Orenburg 1924. M. Tishchepayew, *Materiial dlya istorii Kirgiz-kazakhskogo naroda*, Tashkent 1925. (W. BARTHOLO)

P. 1026-B

162

162 COMPOSITION OF POPULATION--distribution of population by age, sex, locality, marital status, mode of life (e.g., rural and urban, nomadic and sedentary), and by social groupings (e.g., occupation, religion, class, ethnic group); size of families; etc. See also:

Defectives and dependents	73	Ethnic stratification	563
Literacy	212	Age at marriage	582
Location and distribution of settlements	361	Incidence of plural marriages	595
Urban and rural differentiation	369	Statistics on crime	674
Occupational specialization	463	Educational statistics	871



Approximate location of Kazak Ordas and principal surrounding tribes in the middle of the eighteenth century.

[5 BLANK]

[300 cont.]

161 divisions of these hordes into several parts, he will be fully convinced that an exact census of this people is absolutely impossible.

Thus it is necessary to be content with information, no doubt quite uncertain, which they themselves have transmitted to the
162 Russians and which is far from resting on adequate data. The result of this is that the three hordes are composed of approximately 400,000 tents or families, and that of this number, the Great Horde has about 75,000, the Middle Horde 165,000, and the Little Horde 160,000 (1).

1. Since the beginning of the 14th /19th?/ century, the Little Horde has suffered considerable losses in men, as much through internal dissensions as through misunderstandings with their neighbors.

The number of individuals living in each tent is not always the same, but there is good ground for believing that the truth will not be distorted in carrying it to five or six, on the average. Consequently, the Great Horde would have 375,000 to 450,000 persons, the Middle Horde about 1,000,000, and the Little Horde about 900,000, while the three together would make up from 2,000,000 to 2,400,000 persons of both sexes.

Chapter II. Division of the People.

631 No matter what differences in origin are attributed to the tribes which make up the nation of the Kazaks, they have all been fused into a single people living in the same country, which [301] in olden times was subject to a single chief. The proof of this is in the language, the religion, the customs, and the habits, which are everywhere the same.

643 The traditions confirm this, adding further that at the death
173 of one of their khans, who had reigned over the entire nation, his three sons divided it among themselves, and that according to the order of birth of their respective chiefs, these three divisions

162 /141 cont./ According to the
 (101) data of the governor's reports for the 1890's. /142/ there are
 1,875,000 of them, of both sexes, constituting 58% of all the
 Kirghiz-Kazak, including those living in China, in the Bukhara
 and Khiva dominions (1). The Kirghiz /Kazak/ of the Semipalatinsk and

1. The population of the steppe oblasts calls
 itself "Kazak." Many fantastic explanations
 exist for this word. The colonel Kolchi-
 Kadyr was ill, dying of thirst, and left to
 the mercy of fate, and he prayed to
 heaven to send him a speedy death. But
 the heavens took pity upon him, and one
 of the good spirits, a peri, descended in
 the form of a white goose kaz-ak. The
 goose flew away for water, gave the
 sufferer a drink, and remained to live with
 him. The offspring of this marriage received
 the name Kazak. The word "Kirgliz" which
 has come into use also signifying "Kazak"
 was originally completely unknown to the
 latter, and they first began to hear the word
 primarily from Russians. In the older horde
 of the Kaisak there is a "Kyrgyz" clan. This
 is one of the most ancient Turkic tribes. The
 Kyrgyz were known of old for their attacks on
 cities, villages, and caravans, and their name
 became hated by their neighbors. The later
 "Kazak" began to be called Kirghiz as a
 consequence of their raids on their neighbors.
 This word has come into general use, gradually
 forcing out the real name used by the people--
Kazak.

101 The Kirghiz/Kazak/ of the Semipalatinsk and
 Akmolinsk oblasts consist chiefly of certain Turkic tribes: the
 Kerei /or Kerey/, Naiman /or Nayman/, Alchin, /or Kipchak/,
 Alchin, and Arghyn.

H.T.
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[167]
[496] /181 cont. /

Only in the 1890's when immigration into the region was intensified and especially after the Siberian railway had been laid, the towns along it began to grow and develop markedly. In the diagram on page 73 the growth of several Siberian towns is shown. The following diagram on page 76 shows the size of the towns in thousands of inhabitants, and the number of males and females, from data for 1900.

H.T.
162

The non-urban population of the region can be divided into rural and nomadic groups. According to the data of the general census of 1897, it is distributed among villages, nomadic villages /aul/, and campsites in the following manner:

Oblasts	Populated Places	Residents
● ^K [162] Akmolinsk	6,552 (1)	608,316
Semipalatinsk	8,913 (1)	634,345
Turgai	499	430,096
Ural	849	582,703
	16,813	2,255,460

1. Including small Kirghiz /Kazak/ camps of 25, 10, and fewer persons.

H.T.
361
162

In 1900 there were the following number of Russian villages:

In Akmolinsk oblast ... 198	with	77,057 people in them
" Semipalatinsk " ... 160	"	47,047 " " "
" Turgai " ... 30 (?)	"	21,781 " " "
" Ural " ... 158	"	172,415 " " "

H.T.
361

The number of these villages is very small in comparison with the area of the region over which they are scattered. In the Akmolinsk oblast, there is one Russian /diagram appears here/ village per 2,420 square versts. in the Semipalatinsk oblast there is one per 2,514 square versts. in the Turgai oblast one per

[Text continues on p. 77]

H.T. /181 cont. /

361 13,361 square versts. and in the Ural oblast one Russian village per 1,800 square versts. Thus if one takes the total number of settlements (and towns), one settlement is found for every 95 square versts. For those who do not know what a Kirghiz /Kazak/ settlement is like, this last figure may be misleading in relation to the actual density of population. In the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts together, for example, there are about 13,000 such Kirghiz /Kazak/ settlements (camps and aul) in which the population is not greater than 50 persons. For the Russian villages the average can be taken as /182/ a village of 500-800 persons. Villages with a population of 1,000 or more are very few in number and these are only old settlements.

H.T. 361 162 The distribution of the population by sex (the number of males and females) is shown on page 78 indicating that the males predominate in the region by a considerable margin (53%). This difference is particularly noticeable in the Semipalatinsk oblast, where there are 31 women for every 37 men. The population of the Turgai oblast has a more equal distribution (22 women for every 24 men).

The distribution of the sedentary population by estate is represented in the next diagram on page 79. It shows that the peasants are the most numerous, in spite of the fact that they began to settle in the region only recently. The Akmolinsk oblast has the largest proportion of peasants, 54.2%, and the Ural oblast has the smallest (16.5%). After them come the Kazak /Cossacks/. /Diagram appears here./ They are most numerous (in proportion to the other estates in the Ural oblast (75%), and least in the Akmolinsk oblast (25%), while in the Turgai oblast there are none at all. The petty bourgeois, the aristocracy, and the raznochinetz /intellectual not belonging to the gentry/ are most numerous in the Turgai oblast (48%) and the Semipalatinsk oblast (41.6%), and fewest in the Ural oblast (8.5%). If one considers the Kirghiz /Kazak/ as an estate, they are the largest group in number (72.1%), as is clearly evident from the diagram. The other estates, constituting, when combined, 27.9% of the population of the entire region, are distributed as follows: 37.5% are peasants, 34.5% are Kazak /Cossacks/, and 28% are aristocrats, clergy, merchants, petty

K
[162]

Preliminary geological surveys had indicated the riches of Kazakhstan in nonferrous metals and liquid and solid fuels, as well as in pastoral products. The Kirgiz republic offered an entirely different economic perspective. Similarly, from the standpoint of ethnic composition, Kazakhstan had a far greater and more diversified minority pattern, the most important of which was the Russian and Ukrainian. These and similar considerations must have impelled the Soviets to separate the two peoples. With the separation of the two political units, the native populations came to be known by the respective names of the republics, the people in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs and those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz.

At the time of the 1926 census so few Kazakhs were enumerated in Kirgizia and so few Kirgiz in Kazakhstan—a few thousand in either case—that it seems obvious what must have happened. The division into two republics had taken place a few months before the census. An arbitrary decision must have been made to list all Kirgiz-Kazakhs and Kara-Kirgiz in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs, and all those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz. Those who fell outside this division amounted to two-tenths of one per cent of the total population.

As suggested above, the Soviets have had some idea of determining political boundaries according to economic factors. The valley of the Syr-Darya is split between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By consideration of ethnic composition (the area is heavily Uzbek), and for historical and geographical reasons, the entire area should be in Uzbekistan. The triangle between the cities of Tashkent, Dzhambul, and Turkestan is a cotton-growing region; two-thirds of it is in Kazakhstan, despite the fact that cotton is an Uzbek specialty. On the other hand, the coal mining districts of Chimkent and Lenger, also within this triangle, are outside the pattern set down for Uzbekistan. Apparently Kazakhstan is regarded as a center of mining and extractive industries; hence the cotton area was broken up.

As a result of these various factors, many Uzbeks have been deposited in Kazakhstan, and in 1939 more than 300,000 Kazakhs, or 10 per cent of their total number, were living on Uzbek soil. These are Kazakhs who live immediately over the border—not scattered pockets which could be assigned only with difficulty to Kazakh administration. In 1939, because of these and related losses in the north, one-sixth of all Kazakhs in the USSR lived outside Kazakhstan, with the result that they became a minority in their own republic. The process has continued, and today the Kazakhs constitute little more than a third of the population of their native republic. Soon the name Kazakhstan will be an anachronism.

This situation is only in part due to a policy of dividing in order to rule; it is also intended to inundate the Kazakhs with ethnically more reliable elements in order to rule the better.

REGIONAL HISTORY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SETTING

Central Asia has experienced many waves of invasion over the three thousand years of its history. Early invaders were Scythians, ancestors

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Most of these early estimates were phrased in terms of number of Kazakh households. Assuming an average of five persons per household, one can derive such figures as the following for the number of Kazakhs in the Russian empire in the 19th century: 1,950,000 in 1824, 2,000,000 in 1832, and 2,200,000 in 1871. The 1897 Census, which included all but a few thousand Kazakhs resident in China, gave the Kazakh population as 3,800,000. This was the only 19th century estimate with any claim to accuracy. 161

These estimates indicate a general consistency to the population trends of the 19th century. The increase occurred despite a series of wars of liberation, rebellions, and other evidences of unrest; this was the era of the Kazakh wars and uprisings against the Russians. [668]

The rapid increase which started in the last three decades of the 19th century continued into the beginning of the 20th. In 1911 the number of Kazakhs living within the Russian empire was estimated at 4,400,000, an increase of 13.6 per cent in 14 years.

From the beginning of the 19th century, then, when the earliest extensive Russian investigation of Central Asia took place, to the eve of World War I the Kazakh population approximately doubled. The rate of increase appears to have been low at the beginning of the period, rising toward the end.

KAZAKHS IN THE 1926 CENSUS

According to the 1926 Census of the Soviet Union, there were 3,970,000 Kazakhs in the USSR. Of these, some 3,700,000 lived in Kazakhstan (comprising 57% of the population of the republic) and 270,000 outside the republic.

The absolute drop from 1911 to 1926 was thus 430,000, or nearly 10 per cent of the Kazakh population. This loss reflects the political conditions of the time. The relatively peaceful period prior to World War I, which had permitted the increase from 1897 to 1911, was followed by a Kazakh uprising in 1916, then by the Russian Revolution and civil war. In the years after the civil war, 1922-1926, improved conditions allowed the Kazakhs to recover to a point slightly exceeding their 1897 number but still considerably below the population estimate of 1911. [668]

In 1926 the great majority of the Kazakhs still maintained their traditional economy of herding. Seventy per cent of all economically active Kazakhs were reported as herders, 27 per cent as agriculturalists (largely mixed farming, i.e., with some herding mixed in), and less than 3 per cent in all other economic activities (such as industrial and white-collar work). 162

Of the 783,000 Kazakh households in Kazakhstan, 205,000 or 26 per cent were permanently settled. While this figure was based only on Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, it agrees with the total farming percentage. Agriculture is a sedentary way of life; approximately the same proportion of total Kazakhs were reported as occupied in agriculture as were reported as sedentary in Kazakhstan. [361]

Preliminary geological surveys had indicated the riches of Kazakhstan in nonferrous metals and liquid and solid fuels, as well as in pastoral products. The Kirgiz republic offered an entirely different economic perspective. Similarly, from the standpoint of ethnic composition, Kazakhstan had a far greater and more diversified minority pattern, the most important of which was the Russian and Ukrainian. These and similar considerations must have impelled the Soviets to separate the two peoples. With the separation of the two political units, the native populations came to be known by the respective names of the republics, the people in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs and those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz.

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595 Traditionally, the Kazakh was permitted to have more than one wife. However, very few men were able to afford the expense involved, because marriage required large payments by the family of the groom to the family of the bride. For those who could afford it, the possession of many wives meant an increase in prestige and status. Sometimes a man took another wife because he had not had any sons by the first wife. But in general, even though plural wives were permitted, such marriages were few in number. In 1926, only 104.5 women were reported as married per 100 married men, exclusive of widows and divorcees. In Tsarist times the number was not much larger. At present polygamy is forbidden by law. Nevertheless, it is stubbornly maintained by the Kazakhs, and cases are constantly being reported and denounced in the Soviet press. It is still a matter of status and prestige; the bulk of the polygamous marriages reported today involve men of high position in Soviet life, such as Kazakhs who are presidents of collective farms.

233 The Kazakh herds are composed of sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and camels, usually in that numerical order. Herds cannot be maintained through the entire year in one place, because the grass on the steppes is not rich enough to support them. They must move from month to month and from season to season. However, there are too many herds-men and not enough steppeland to permit indiscriminate wandering. The usual pattern is for a nomadic camp to set up winter quarters where many smaller herding groups come together for religious and economic purposes. Here they store their hay through the winter to feed the livestock, and put up windbreaks against the winter storms. In the early spring they disperse into smaller herding groups of a few families each, and proceed over traditionally fixed grazing routes to the summer camp which they occupy until early fall. Nomadism is a fixed annual round of movement, not a haphazard one.

166 The 1926 census reported that 5.6 per cent of the Kazakh males had established residence outside the district in which they had been born. The comparable figure for women was 20 per cent. The explanation for this difference lies in the marriage customs, under which a Kazakh woman traditionally moves to her husband's family residence. It is almost unheard of for a man to move to the home of his wife's kin or for both to move together to a new residence. Most of the marriages involved a woman's moving only a short distance to her husband's family. But at least a fifth of the women had to move away from their native districts; this usually meant that the marriage had been arranged for them at some distance from their birthplaces.

197 No significant changes in Kazakh life had taken place by the time the first Soviet census was taken in 1926. The first few years of Sovietization had left the Kazakhs more or less untouched. Their economic life, their family life, and the traditional organization of their society had changed only externally. They had come under the unified rule of Moscow instead of continuing their own loose social groupings, but Moscow had not yet begun the transformation of Kazakh life, nor had the Kazakhs yet faced the problems involved in accommodating to or resisting Soviet influence.

161 may be estimated at approximately 1,400,000, if one adds to the actual loss of 900,000 the expected natural increase of 500,000.

648 A number of arguments have been advanced to account for both the actual and the estimated losses. Each has a certain merit, and no single one of them should be pursued at the expense of all the others.

[167] The Soviet explanation is that people from Kazakhstan moved away to the new industrial enterprises of the southern Urals and southern Siberia and to the neighboring Central Asia republics, the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's. This interpretation has not been accompanied by any data. The figures quoted here have been the totals of those listed as Kazakhs in the USSR censuses regardless of place of residence. Therefore, the Soviet statement must mean not only that hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs migrated from Kazakhstan to other parts of the USSR, but also that they gave up their Kazakh nationality in doing so.

[177] This may be part of the story but it cannot be the whole. It is known that the Russians looked with favor on the Russification of native populations and their absorption into the Russian ethnic group, regardless of their forebears. German and Austrian prisoners of war who were sent to Kazakhstan report that many Kazakhs, identifiable by their physiognomy, by their personal and family names, and by their own account of their past, were nevertheless designated Russian in their official papers. But certainly 900,000 of them did not become Russian.

161 During the course of collectivization many Kazakhs were liquidated
648 by the GPU, primarily during the period between the two censuses.
[498] Those liquidated were people who resisted collectivization, but they
[555] were listed as remnants of the former nobility and wealthy people of Kazakhstan. This class was known as the feudal bays. About 700 bay families per year were liquidated, that is turned over to the GPU, during the three-year period 1928-1930. In 1931 it was announced that 23,000 households of bays were to be liquidated. This made an announced total of 25,000 households subject to GPU measures. If all these people were actually liquidated (that is, left to starve or otherwise badly treated), then some 125,000 Kazakhs were eliminated by these means. This is the largest figure for population losses that can be assigned to police measures on the basis of published data.

• [233] It has been stated that between 1930 and 1935, at the height of the
[162] drive for collectivization, the number of Kazakh households engaged in the traditional herding occupation dropped from 567,000 to 158,000. Many of these households went into agriculture and some into industry in Kazakhstan, but others moved across the border, either into neighboring republics or out of the Soviet realm into bordering China. During the 1920's and the first part of the 1930's considerable cross-border movement was still permitted into China and back, according to age-old nomadic patterns. The border was closed in the mid-1930's, and possibly some Kazakhs remained outside the USSR by choice; for example, there is a colony of approximately 30,000 Kazakhs in Outer Mongolia. However, to assign numbers to the population loss in Soviet Kazakhstan through this cross-border movement is a hopeless task.

Again, no reliable estimate has been given for the number of Kazakhs who might have gone over to the neighboring republics within the Soviet Union.

592 live as an independent unit, even though they had their own tent; the group was still part of the husband's father's household.³

621
[114] Extensive studies done in the early 1920's by Rudenko describe the family life among Kazakhs of the Middle Horde. In one aul or nomadic village, there were 13 tents in a line. Five of the 13 "belonged" to the head of the aul, and of these three contained women; that is, three were tents of married persons, for women received tents only on marriage. Rich auls were small, with few families; poor auls were large, with many families joining in their poverty. One such poor aul contained 60 families; Samoilovich describes a richer grouping of 505 tents in 100 auls of three to eight tents each.³

[560]
[554] Very little information is available on the size of households or the extended family. Samoilovich gave 2,408 as the number of individuals living in the 505 tents, or 4.76 per tent.³ Equating tents with married couples, but also allowing for bachelors and childless couples in some tents, one can infer a high fertility in this particular community. This account is one of the very few detailed demographic pictures of a small community of Kazakhs living in the traditional fashion. It is difficult to generalize from such a description, but one gets a sense of the direction such figures are likely to take.

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[162] In Turkic nomad communities there are generally fewer women than men; a ratio of 900 females to 1,000 males exists among Kazakhs. The Kirgiz and the Yakut of Northern Siberia present a similar picture. [582] Among these people, however, men tend to marry late in life, while social norms dictate that women marry early. This is shown by the fact that, in 1926, 41 out of every 1,000 Kazakh males reached the age of 40 unmarried, while only three out of every 1,000 women were still single at 40. More than 75 per cent of the women married by the age of 20; Kazakh men reached that percentage only in the age group 30-34. Hence there is actually a surplus of women seeking marriage, and this allows for a certain amount of polygamy, since a woman will marry a man who already has a wife rather than remain unmarried.

[595] As noted before, the extended family is patriarchal in character; authority is vested in the senior male of the household. All decisions 593 rest with him, and rarely can appeal be made beyond his word. The [562] entire society centers around the father-son axis, the central point of the marriage life and family happiness is the bearing of a son. The son is the assurance that the line will be continued; on a larger scale, this pattern of descent in the paternal line is the web that holds the society together. [187] This is an extreme case of a father-son oriented society. Few of the factors which tend to modify strict patriarchal control in other societies can be seen here. The Chinese and the Japanese have a patrilineal family system, but in these societies, although the father [177] is the center of authority, the mother is the center of a different circle of emotion, one of love and warmth, and the family life involves both circles.

³USSR Census 1926, vol. 34.

³Rudenko et al, 1930, p. 311.

³Samoilovich, in Rudenko et al, 1930.

Table 8

PROPORTION OF KAZAKHS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION
AND IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Year	Population	Kazakh Proportion of Total Population (%)	Party Members and Candidates	Kazakh Proportion of Total Membership (%)
1926	6,503,000 ^a	57 ^b	32,000 ^c	35 ^c
1939	6,146,000 ^a	42 ^b	109,000 ^d	52 ^d
1949	6,650,000 ^a	41 ^e	229,000 ^e	40 ^b

^aUSSR Census.^bLarimer and Goldware estimates (89).^cGoloshchekin, 1931.^dBol'shevik Kazakhstan, Feb 49.^eBy interpolation from Goldware's estimates for 1948 and 1950 (89).^fBased on Goldware's report on KSSR population (89).^gKazakhstanskia Pravda, 25 Feb 49.^hIbid., 16 Jan 51.

Table 9

WOMEN IN THE KSSR COMMUNIST PARTY

Year	All Women (Per Cent of All Members and Candidates)	Kazakh Women (Per Cent of All Members and Candidates)
1927 ^a	7.7	1.3
1940 ^b	13.9	ND
1945 ^b	32.1	ND
1949 ^c	19.2	4.0

^aGoloshchekin, 1931.^bBol'shevik Kazakhstan, Feb 49.^cKazakhstanskia Pravda, 16 Jan 51.

ND: No data available.

criticisms by Party leaders indicate that more women would be welcomed into the ranks and that the Kazakh Communist Party has a bad recruiting record; one can therefore assume that the rather low number of women in the Party is not due to any officially stated policy of exclusion. Only during the war years were any significant gains made. Especially poor is Party recruiting performance among women of Kazakh nationality (see Table 9). A set of figures, however, cannot adequately describe the role women play in the Kazakh Communist Party. In recent times women have been placed in responsible positions in increasing numbers. In 1951, for example, 12 out of 85 members of the Central Committee were women, and every regional committee and almost 90 per cent of the districts and cities had one female secretary.¹

¹According to figures in Melnasser's book (98) and in Kazakhstanskia Pravda, 20 Mar 47 and 26 Feb 49, women took a considerably more active part in government. From 1947 through 1952, consistently over one-third of all local Soviet delegates were women; out of 400 Supreme Soviet members, 149 were women (37%); Sovetskiaia Zhenskikhina, Sep-Oct, 1952.

Committee. Since that time, Party and government have been publicly associated and closely allied in personnel, operation, and performance.

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF KAZAKHSTAN

The administrative structure of Kazakhstan is at present identical to that in other soviet socialist republics in the USSR, and for that reason no detailed description of the structure itself will be given here. (See Figure 5.) There have, however, been a number of changes in the administrative organization of the republic in the past, and these will be briefly noted.

In 1925 there were 6 regions, 2 circuits, and 123 districts. The district (raion) was first formed in 1924 and may be regarded as a "miniature region" whose boundaries are determined primarily by economic factors. During the 1920's a transition took place from territorial to economic divisions. The last province (gubernia) was abolished in 1930, and in the same year the circuit (okrug) went almost completely out of existence. With its disappearance, the districts became directly subordinated to the regions. Autonomous republics were under the direct jurisdiction of a union republic; Kazakhstan was such an autonomous unit until 1936, forming part of the RSFSR.

Each district is administratively subdivided into village, aul, collective farm, and other soviets (councils). Cities and other settlements of an urban nature form another part of the administrative structure. Usually they are directly subordinated to a district, but large and economically important cities come under direct regional or republic jurisdiction.

By 1936 Kazakhstan had nine regions (oblasts). In 1949 the territorial subdivision of Kazakhstan looked like this: 16 regions; 36 cities (the capital, Alma-Ata, of republic jurisdiction, 20 cities of regional jurisdiction, 15 cities of district jurisdiction); 203 rural districts; 9 municipal wards; 2,674 rural (village or aul) soviets; 115 settlements of city type.

In 1928, out of a total of 3,888 village-aul soviets, 2,199 were Kazakh, 1,209 Russo-Ukrainian, and 115 Russo-Cossack; 140 were "mixed," and there were 225 soviets of unenumerated minor nationalities. By 1931 the total village-aul soviets numbered 3,763; of these, 2,169 were Kazakh, 1,470 "others," and 124 "mixed." No ethnic breakdown is available for the 1949 figure of 2,674 village-aul soviets. Of the 182 districts listed in 1930, 112 were Kazakh; for 1949 no ethnic breakdown exists.

Some information is available on the nationality and social composition among the Supreme Soviet representation. At the 1947 Soviet Congress the 300 deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the KSSR included

¹See Constitution of the Kazakh SSR, as amended through 1961.

²USSR, *Administrative-Territorial nos Delenie Sotsialnykh Respublik*, May 1949, pp. 272-296.

³Tolk, *Materialy i Otchety* . . . , 1928.

⁴Vos' Kazakhstan, 1961.

⁵Revolution i Natsionalizm, No. 6, 1930, p. 14.

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872Table 18
PRIMARY EDUCATION IN KAZAKHISTAN^a

Year	Number of Schools	Total Number of Children in School	Kazakh Children in School ^b	Kazakh Proportion of Total Number of Children (%)
1914	ND	105,000	8,400	8
1920-21	2,410	144,000	ND	
1927	3,944	274,000	82,000	30
1929-30	ND	352,000	ND	
1932-33	ND	576,000	230,000	40
1935	ND	797,000	ND	
1939	8,381	1,130,000	ND	
1945-46	7,899	797,000	244,000	30.5
1948-49	ND	1,000,000	ND	
1951-52	ND	1,346,000	ND	
1954	ND	1,300,000	ND	

^aTashiev 1947, pp. 67-68; Abdykalykov and Pankratova; *Kaf'turmain Sroislof'stov*, 1940, pp. 58, 251; *Sov'skaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, 1st and 2nd eds.; *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 19 Feb 54.

^bIncludes all children instructed in the Kazakh language.
ND: No data available.

of Kazakh school children and from the proportion of Kazakh school teachers (see Table 19). Unfortunately, no data are available on the proportion of Kazakh teachers after 1946, which was the first full school year after the war. Nevertheless, the 1946 percentage of almost 32 per cent is consistent with the last published figures on the proportion of Kazakh school children in the schools of Kazakhstan.

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563Table 19
TEACHERS IN KAZAKHISTAN SCHOOLS^a

Year	All Teachers	Kazakh Teachers ^b	Kazakh Proportion of all Teachers (%)
1914	3,725	ND	ND
1939	42,500	13,500	30.1
1943	30,000	12,900	40.3
1946	37,635	12,000	31.7

^aIncludes primary and middle schools (through the 10th grade). Tashiev, pp. 67-68; Abdykalykov and Pankratova; *Kaf'turmain Sroislof'stov*, 1940, pp. 58, 251; *Sov'skaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, 1st and 2nd eds.; *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, 19 Feb 54.

^bIncludes all those teaching in the Kazakh language.
ND: No data available.

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[Inner Horde]

-493-

601 Khan Bukel was related to all the other members
 825 of his clan and horde through real or assumed descent
 619 from a common ancestor. But Bukel was at the same time
 162 a descendant of Chingis Khan directly, and a descendant
 of a junior line of Abul-Hair. His horde because of its
 recent formation,¹ small size, and relative instability,
 retained many features of clan structure which it had
 until recently possessed. It was divided into two es-
 tates: the white bone and the black. As to the white
 bone, ak sūsk, we have somewhat more detailed data as
 to its composition than for the other hordes. It had
 three components in the Inner Horde, according to data
 gathered in 1849-1850, in addition to the direct senior
 descendants of the Khan himself; these were descendants
 of Khan Bukel in the junior line, clan leaders, and
 aristocrats without duties, all of whom totalled to
 about 200 ak sūsk, 85 percent falling in the last cate-
 gory, those without duties, i.e., junior aristocratic
 229 lines, exclusive of Khan Bukel's cadet line, who
 formed a separate noble category.

613 Among the lineage names of this time, familiar
 162 ones appear, such as the lineage of Adai, homonymous
 with the one visited by Karuts on the Mangyshlak penin-
 sula about fifty years later. These lineages ranged in
 number of families from 120 to 5000; and counting the

229 Ibid., 11.

† [i.e. in 1800; cf. vol. 14, AMI Mongolia, p. 491 --
 Analyst]

-494-

613 aristocracy as a lineage, they numbered eighteen. Of
162 these, ten numbered between 120 and 900 families; four
numbered between 1100 and 1800 families; three contained
between 2600 and 3200 families, and one had 8000. ²³⁰

These lineage figures indicate the range in the number of people who considered themselves close agnatically. There is the consanguineal tie recognized by all Kazakhs, and that which is recognized by members of a given horde. There is finally a consanguinity vaguely recognized between a member of a clan bearing the name Kongrad among the Uzbeks, and the Kongrad clan of the Kazakhs. But closeness of relationship in the paternal line such as is found within lineages and measured by the functions that such a grouping has, is not found among the larger units. One might marry outside one's clan, or even outside one's horde; but the real exogamic unit was the lineage, whether major (maximal) or minor (minimal); the lineage members supported each other and their bi in humble matters, such as the supplying of an oath-taker or a witness in a dispute, supporting the judgment of the bi, helping to pay a major or minor indemnity; making common cause against rustlers or feuding parties; dividing and sharing pasturages; and so forth. For these reasons, it was important to know how many kinsmen a man had for purposes of the daily life of the community;

-495-

[Inner Horde]

613 and it was likewise important to know what the range
 • 162 was within which these kin groupings fell. It is impor-
 [61] tant to know that the population density of the Bukel
 Horde was 0.2 per sq. km. of their lands actually in
 use for the greater part of the year, including their
 own and leased lands; that the figure is slightly lower,
 0.17 per sq. km., if the useless lands (arid, sandy,
 salty, etc.) and the disputed lands (with the Ural or
 New-Line Cossacks) are taken into account. ²³¹ These
 figures are not only of interest for demographic, eco-
 nomic or ecological purposes; they are of interest in
 the study of kinship, for they indicate the limits
 within which close kin may be reckoned, they tell us
 how low the number may fall before the lineage members
 will seek to fuse with another group, and how high the
 number may reach before the group will divide into two
 or more by the process of fission. Thus, number itself
 relates significantly to kinship principles and to so-
 cial structural principles.

233 These numerical data ¹ must in their turn be brought
 613 together with other data, to answer still further ques-
 tions: were the Inner or Bukel Horde Kazakhs herders
 like their Kalmuk, and Little Horde neighbors, like the
 Khalkha Mongols, etc.? For example, two Bukel Horde
 groups in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea in 1852 show

²³¹ Ibid., 12.

A [cf. cat. 11b, AHI Mongolia, pp. 491-495 for
 Context -- Analyst]